Country G in Southern Europe has long been a high‑risk jurisdiction for trade fraud. Recently, however, fraudsters have devised new deceptive tactics in cases involving goods shipped to Country G.
Recently, China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation has received multiple claims from insured parties concerning buyers based in developed economies such as Switzerland and France, with goods ultimately shipped to Country G. Investigations reveal that these buyers from developed countries all deny entering into transactions with the insured and receiving the goods, while the cargo has already been collected in Country G.
This article describes the primary fraud tactics deployed by such "buyers" in recent cases. Based on common vulnerabilities exposed by these perpetrators, relevant risk‑mitigation recommendations are also provided.
1 Primary Fraud Tactics Used by "Buyers"
(1) Impersonating Well‑Reputed or Creditworthy Companies in Developed Countries
To help exporters successfully obtain credit limits, certain "buyers" place orders by impersonating well‑known or credit‑rated companies in developed countries including Switzerland and France. Prior to establishing purported transactions with exporters, these "buyers" forge the corporate seals of the impersonated entities, create email addresses with suffixes highly similar to those of the target companies, and set up near‑identical counterfeit websites to mislead exporters.
(2) Attending Trade Fairs to Gain Exporters’ Trust
After completing such preparatory work, the "buyers" produce business cards and other materials, attend various product trade fairs and exhibitions, and make contact with exporters. Once they have gained exporters’ confidence, they place large‑volume orders and demand that goods be delivered to third‑country destinations such as Country G.
(3) Defrauding Cargo from Shipping Carriers Using Forged Seals
Upon obtaining original bills of lading or telex release bills of lading, the "buyers" pose as bill‑of‑lading consignees. Using forged seals, they issue documents such as cargo‑release authorisations to fraudulently obtain goods from destination‑port freight forwarders, before disappearing without trace.
The two images below show the genuine seal of the impersonated entity obtained during an investigation into one case, alongside the seal appearing on the cargo‑release authorisation provided by the destination‑port freight forwarder.
2 Potential Red Flags Left by "Buyers"
Case investigations have identified suspicious inconsistencies in information submitted by these "buyers" to insured parties. Warning signs mainly relate to buyer‑information matching, corporate seals, email accounts and corporate websites.
(1) Contradictory "Buyer" Information
Case 1
In this instance, a "buyer" posing as a major French retail group placed purchase orders with an exporter. Nevertheless, the VAT number FR 20410409460 supplied to the exporter by the "buyer" belonged to AN HYPERMARCHE rather than AN SUPERMARCHE.
Case 2
Here, a "buyer" impersonated a Swiss company to place orders with an exporter. The counterfeit seal featured above displays a telephone area code of (0)22. Within Switzerland, (0)22 is the area code for the Canton of Geneva, whereas the address printed on the seal is located in the Canton of St. Gallen, whose area code is (0)71.
(2) Flawed "Buyer" Seals
Case 1: Misspelled Words in Address
In this case, a "buyer" impersonated a French company to procure goods from an exporter. The left section above shows the corporate address listed on the "buyer’s" purchase order, and the right section shows the purported corporate seal. The seal contains a spelling error in the French word "PORTE".
Case 2: Incomplete Address
Here, a "buyer" posing as a French company placed orders with an exporter. The counterfeit seal produced by fraudsters appears on the left in the above illustration, and the genuine seal of the impersonated company is shown on the right. The address printed on the left‑hand seal only contains a street name, with no specific house number.
Case 3: Incorrect Address Format
In this case, a "buyer" impersonated a Swiss company to place orders with an exporter. The counterfeit seal above features an address with obvious formatting errors. Per address‑writing standards observed across most European nations, the buyer’s address should read: "VIA F. PELLI 2 6900 LUGANO SWITZERLAND". Furthermore, Lugano is the name of a Swiss city and ought not to appear on the Postal Code line.
(3) Overly Simplistic Buyer Seals
Across numerous cases, seals displaying only the buyer’s name (as shown above) with minimal supplementary information tend to be forgeries. Authentic corporate seals generally include the corporate address, telephone number, and in some instances the name and job title of relevant responsible personnel.
(4) Buyer Email Suffixes Inconsistent with Corporate Website Domains
In one case, a "buyer" impersonated a French company to purchase goods from an exporter. The legitimate corporate website for this French company is www.an.fr, yet the "buyer" used the email suffix an‑eu.com. Additionally, only the abbreviated corporate name "A****N", rather than the full legal entity name, appeared in the email signature — inconsistent with standard email practices for large corporations.
(5) Email Suffixes Featuring Slight Alterations to the Target Entity’s Name
Fraudsters frequently use email suffixes with minor modifications to the name of the company being impersonated. For example, a "buyer" pretending to represent French Group AN provided the exporter with the email address sales@1an.fr. Another "buyer" impersonating Belgian CHX.SA supplied info@chxx.com alongside the corporate website www.ch*****xx.com.
3 Risk‑Prevention Recommendations
Exporters receiving purchase orders from buyers requesting shipment of goods to third countries — especially Balkan states such as Country G — should pay close attention to the points below:
(1) Check Corporate Domain Registration Details via whois.com
Exporters may look up a buyer’s corporate domain‑registration information on whois.com. Particular attention should be paid to:
Registrar: whether it corresponds to the buyer company;
Registration date: whether the domain was registered shortly before the buyer placed the order or has a relatively short registration history;
Name Server: whether the country‑code top‑level domain matches the buyer’s country of origin.
(2) Verify Buyer Information for Suspicious Clues
Where contact details and corporate seals are provided by the buyer, carefully screen for potential anomalies. Check whether the buyer uses free‑service email providers such as GMAIL, YAHOO or HOTMAIL; whether email suffixes contain slight manipulations of the corporate name; whether near‑duplicate counterfeit websites exist; and whether the buyer’s seal exhibits any of the red flags outlined above.
(3) Cross‑Reference Contact Person Details against Official Corporate Webpages
For large or well‑known buyer companies, cross‑check contact‑person information against content published on the official corporate website. Confirm consistency of email‑domain suffixes and partial matches in telephone numbers. Where necessary, telephone the buyer company directly to verify whether the contact person holds valid authorisation.
(4) Exercise Caution When Dispatching Bills of Lading; Ensure Mailing Address Matches the Buyer’s Registered Address
Exporters should minimise use of telex‑release bills of lading, and avoid couriering original bills of lading to addresses not operated by the buyer — especially addresses in third‑party countries. Strictly ensure that bill‑of‑lading delivery addresses align with the verified business address of the buyer.
This article outlines risk‑mitigation approaches based on typical patterns observed in recent fraud cases involving shipments to Country G. Nevertheless, international trade is complex and evolving, and fraudulent tactics continue to emerge. When authenticating overseas buyers, exporters should also deploy supplementary tools such as credit investigations to build a comprehensive, multi‑dimensional evaluation framework, and promptly refine risk‑prevention protocols in response to newly‑emerging market threats.hen Dispatching Bills of Lading; Ensure Mailing Address Matches the Buyer’s Registered Address
Exporters should minimise use of telex‑release bills of lading, and avoid couriering original bills of lading to addresses not operated by the buyer — especially addresses in third‑party countries. Strictly ensure that bill‑of‑lading delivery addresses align with the verified business address of the buyer.
This article outlines risk‑mitigation approaches based on typical patterns observed in recent fraud cases involving shipments to Country G. Nevertheless, international trade is complex and evolving, and fraudulent tactics continue to emerge. When authenticating overseas buyers, exporters should also deploy supplementary tools such as credit investigations to build a comprehensive, multi‑dimensional evaluation framework, and promptly refine risk‑prevention protocols in response to newly‑emerging market threats.
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